Joint light tactical vehicle and mine resistant ambush protected all-terrain vehicle optimum procurement ratio by Mattox, Kyle E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2012-12
Joint light tactical vehicle and mine resistant ambush
protected all-terrain vehicle optimum procurement ratio
Mattox, Kyle E.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27866












Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited 
JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE AND MINE 
RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED ALL-TERRAIN 








Thesis Advisor:  Simona Tick 
Associate Advisor: Keith Snider 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704–0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2012 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE AND MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH 
PROTECTED ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLE OPTIMUM PROCUREMENT RATIO 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Kyle E. Mattox 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis builds an optimization decision model that can be used to determine the optimum ratio of the two vehicles 
that the Army and Marine Corps can purchase to minimize costs while taking into account constraints related to each 
vehicles’ capabilities, such as required off-road capabilities and transport ease for missions supported by the services. 
The proposed optimization decision model is a cost minimizing non-linear programming model that also accounts for 
changes in the average production cost of each type of vehicle by embedding a cumulative average cost formula into 








14. SUBJECT TERMS Linear Programming, Non-Linear Programming, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, 
M-ATV, JLTV 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
61 

















NSN 7540–01–280–5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited 
 
 
JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE AND MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH 
PROTECTED ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLE OPTIMUM PROCUREMENT RATIO 
 
 
Kyle E. Mattox 
Captain, United States Marine Corps 
B.A., Iowa State University, 2007 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
























William Gates  
Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv




This thesis builds an optimization decision model that can be used to determine the 
optimum ratio of the two vehicles that the Army and Marine Corps can purchase to 
minimize costs while taking into account constraints related to each vehicles’ capabilities, 
such as required off-road capabilities and transport ease for missions supported by the 
services. The proposed optimization decision model is a cost minimizing non-linear 
programming model that also accounts for changes in the average production cost of each 
type of vehicle by embedding a cumulative average cost formula into the objective 
function of the model. 
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The Armed Forces of the United States face many new threats while in combat 
operations. Among these threats are those posed by improvised explosive devices (IED). 
The Army and Marine Corps initially responded to the IED threat in 2003 by adding 
armor to the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV); however the 
weight of the added armor on the HMMWV deteriorated the vehicle’s automotive 
performance to the point that adding addition armor was no longer prudent. In 2007, the 
Army and Marine Corps began building Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 
vehicles. 
In 2009, as the magnitude of the war in Iraq began to decline and efforts shifted to 
the war in Afghanistan, the limits of the MRAP were exceeded, as the size and weight of 
the vehicle are too great to be effective in the high altitude rugged terrain. A lighter 
version of the vehicle was needed to navigate the high mountain roads of Afghanistan 
while still providing protection from IEDs. The urgent need was filled by the MRAP All-
terrain Vehicle (M-ATV). This vehicle is much more capable off-road and on high 
mountain roads than the MRAP, but is still too heavy to be carried by helicopters, 
specifically the Army’s CH-47 or the Marine Corps’ CH-53. By the end of 2010, 
approximately 8,000 M-ATVs were produced (GAO, 2010, p. 3).  
The size and weight of the MRAP vehicles are both a logistical burden and 
prevent the vehicles from operating on high altitude rugged terrain like that found in 
Afghanistan. In 2005 the services identified the need for a new generation of lightweight 
tactical wheeled vehicles to replace the aging HMMWVs. As the IED threat became 
more pronounced in 2007, a requirement was added that the new vehicles have the armor 
protection of the MRAP, but weigh much less and be able to replace the HMMWV for 
many tactical missions. Work on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) began in 2005, 
with an anticipated procurement date of 2015. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are 
planning to jointly purchase an expected 60,000 JLTVs (GAO, 2011, p. 31). The JLTV 
and the M-ATV are both light tactical wheeled vehicles that serve very similar roles and 
are capable of completing many of the same missions. The similarities between the two 
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vehicles open the services to criticism about the level of unplanned duplication in 
acquisition programs, and if money can be saved by purchasing more or less of one or the 
other vehicles.  
This thesis builds an optimization decision model that takes into account the 
capabilities of the two types of vehicles, JLTVs and M-ATVs, to determine the optimum 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
A. OVERVIEW 
The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV) and the 
Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) are light tactical wheeled vehicles (LTWV) currently 
being procured by the Department of Defense (DoD). The M-ATV is a member of the 
Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Family of Vehicles (FoV). It was rapidly 
procured and sent to troops in Afghanistan in 2009 to meet the Improvised Explosive 
Device (IED) threat that the High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 
cannot meet, but the vehicle is very heavy. In 2005, planning for the JLTV began. The 
JLTV is being developed to offer the same level of protection provided by the MRAP 
FoV, while maintaining a lighter weight, similar to that of the HMMWV. Both vehicles, 
the M-ATV and the JLTV, represent huge expenditures of up to $12.5 billion and 
$18.5 billion, respectively, but share many duplicative capabilities (GAO, 2011, p. 31). 
Several studies focus on the need to reduce duplication, develop a DoD Tactical Wheeled 
Vehicle (TWV) strategy, recapitalize the HMMWV fleet, and the acquisition structure. 
This chapter reviews these studies and highlights the most important issues that have 
been considered, as they relate to this thesis.   
B. REDUCE DUPLICATION 
Among the primary concerns of the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) is unplanned duplication that would result in billions of additional dollars spent 
for the same capability. As the GAO writes in 2011: “DoD’s acquisition of two similar 
tactical wheeled vehicles—the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle, including an 
all-terrain variant, and eventually the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle—creates a risk of 
unplanned overlap in capabilities that could increase acquisition costs significantly” 
(p. 31). The GAO (2010) is not advocating the use of one vehicle over the other. It rather 
advocates a measured approach to determine where areas of overlap can be avoided and 
procurement numbers can be reduced. “Any potential offsets between the MRAP vehicles 
and JLTVs, to the extent they are supported by cost-benefit analyses, could save both 
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acquisition and support costs” (abstract paragraph 3). Defense Industry Daily also 
recognized duplications between the M-ATV and several other TWVs. On May 30, 2012, 
the Defense Industry Daily writes: 
Oshkosh’s design bore many visual similarities to their JLTV TD Phase 
entry, but without the high-end systems like a hybrid drive, which would 
have required further development. The core of the vehicle is the U.S. 
Marines’ MTVR medium truck chassis, and its TAK-4 suspension. TAK-4 
is being used to refit Cougar MRAPs, and already exceeds M-ATV’s off 
road specifications by offering a 70% off road mobility profile (M-ATV 
specs: 50%), with more than 16 inches of independent wheel travel. An 
Oshkosh representative told DID that “generally speaking [TAK-4] will 
increase the speed of the vehicle by 1.5–2.5 times over the speed of the 
same vehicle with a straight axle suspension, without sacrificing ride 
quality. The vehicle’s C7 engine is also broadly common to other vehicles, 
and was used in more than 18,000 vehicles fielded in Iraq and Afghanistan 
at the time of the award. (paragraph 2)  
Defense Industry Daily recognizes these duplications in a positive light, but it is easy to 
identify why some observers would be concerned that the DoD is procuring multiple 
versions of similarly capable vehicles. 
The GAO is concerned that the DoD is focusing on the procurement of JLTV to 
meet the needs of the war fighter, and only views the MRAP FoV as a stop-gap measure 
to fill the existing need until JLTV is fielded. As the GAO (2011) states: 
To date, the services have not considered using the vehicles in the Mine 
Resistant Ambush Protected family—with the exception of some vehicles 
planned for use by route clearance, explosives ordnance disposal, and 
medical evacuation units—to offset the need for or replace other tactical 
wheeled vehicles. Currently, the services consider Mine Resistant Ambush 
Protected vehicles to be mainly additive to their fleets. Given the high 
potential cost of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, reducing the number of 
units acquired could offer substantial savings, albeit with potential 
performance tradeoffs. To illustrate, a 5 percent reduction in Joint Light 
Tactical Vehicle quantities could save nearly $2.5 billion, assuming a unit 
cost of $800,000. (p. 31) 
Those who meet the GAO’s recommendations with skepticism should take 
comfort that the GAO recognizes the JLTV is not a copy or duplication of any existing 
vehicle, and that it will bring capabilities to the war fighter that other vehicles cannot. 
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According to the GAO (2011): “JLTV is being designed to protect its occupants from the 
effects of mines and improvised explosive devices without sacrificing its payload 
capability or its automotive performance, which has not been the case with the other 
tactical wheeled vehicles” (p. 4). This is an acknowledgment by the GAO of the JLTVs 
usefulness in the TWV fleet. The GAO (2010) also acknowledges the DoD’s efforts to 
improve efficiency and reduce duplication. As the GAO observes: 
In addition, the Secretary of Defense has recently announced several 
initiatives to free-up funds for modernization and to create efficiencies in 
programs. This is a contingency that may also have an influence on the 
DoD-wide strategy by reinforcing the need to minimize the potential for 
unplanned overlap or duplication (p. 23). 
This thesis recognizes the importance placed on avoiding duplication. Therefore, 
it proposes a decision model that can address the duplication by incorporating in the cost-
minimization decision process a distinct rating system of the capabilities of each vehicle, 
the M-ATVs and the JLTVs. Details are presented in Chapter IV. 
C. TWV STRATEGIES 
The GAO contends that building a DoD-wide TWV strategy is the best way to 
identify the needs the DoD intends to meet with future TWV acquisitions while avoiding 
unplanned duplication. Erwin (2011) echoes this argument while highlighting the 
complexity of pursing multiple urgently needed TWV strategies while avoiding 
duplication. The U.S. Department of the Army (Army) recently updated its TWV strategy 
and the U.S. Department of the Navy’s United States Marine Corps (Marines) has done 
the same, but the DoD is still creating the comprehensive DoD strategy.  
The GAO recognized the need for a comprehensive DoD strategy to reduce the 
risk of duplication. The GAO (2011) points out: “Since 2008, GAO has identified tactical 
wheeled vehicle procurement as being at risk for duplication, and in 2009 GAO 
recommended that DoD develop a unified acquisition strategy” (p. 31). The GAO 
contends the strategy should be all encompassing and recognizes the complexity of such 
a strategy. The GAO (2011) also continues: “DoD could save both acquisition and  
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support costs through a department wide tactical wheeled vehicle strategy that considers 
costs and benefits of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle compared to other tactical wheeled 
vehicle options” (p. 32). 
The GAO (2011) views the need for a DoD TWV strategy as paramount. The 
GAO points out: “DoD does not have a unified tactical wheeled vehicle strategy that 
considers timing, capabilities, affordability, and sustainability. DoD stated in 2009 that it 
would create a unified plan for tactical wheeled vehicle investment decisions” (p. 31–32). 
The GAO (2010) continues, “as of September 2010, DoD has not yet set a timetable for 
completing the strategy. In recommending such a strategy and implementation plan in 
2009, we noted that the DoD should 
 assess and prioritize the capabilities and requirements of similar vehicles 
needed in the near and long term; 
 estimate the funding, time, and technologies that will be required to 
acquire, improve, and sustain these systems; 
 balance protection, payload, and performance needs with available 
resources, especially for light tactical vehicles; and 
 identify contingencies in case there are development problems, delays 
with key systems, or funding constraints” (p. 23). 
While the GAO has been consistent about the need for a DoD TWV strategy, it 
credits the services for updating their respective TWV strategies and relies on those 
strategies to ensure the services are procuring vehicles that are in keeping with their 
stated plans. The GAO (2012) points out: “The Army and Marine Corps updated their 
individual tactical wheeled vehicle strategies in January 2011 and June 2011, 
respectively” (p. 4). The GAO (2010) continues: “Both services have also acknowledged 
that planning uncertainties included JLTV cost and performance, and emphasize the need 
for the adoption of TWV strategies that are affordable as a whole” (p. 20). GAO 
acknowledges the services’ strategies are mindful of the need for fiscally conservative 
plans as defense budgets are reduced. The GAO (2010) points out: 
The Army strategy states that in an era of constrained financial support 
and ever-increasing materiel costs, it will work to control cost growth and 




states that the underlying guidance for the strategy requires the fielding of 
an affordable fleet of ground combat and tactical vehicles that provide 
required capabilities and adequate capacity (p. 20).  
Regarding the M-ATV and JLTV, the GAO (2010) finds that the services are in 
compliance with their strategies. The GAO states: 
The acquisition plans for both the M-ATV and JLTV are consistent with 
the services’ TWV strategies, which emphasize maintaining a balance of 
performance, payload, and protection capabilities across their TWV fleets 
as they continue to adjust to the improvised explosive devices/roadside 
bomb threats. M-ATV fulfills a short-term, joint, urgent operational need 
in support of current operations and JLTV is the long-term solution for the 
joint services to replace the HMMWV” (p. 19). 
The Army and the Marines have continued to update their TWV strategies as new 
threats emerge, but they maintain continuity where appropriate.  
“The Army’s October 2009 strategy reiterated that the 2008 Army and Marine 
Corps joint TWV investment strategy was based on four tenets: 
 Take maximum advantage of existing platforms by recapitalizing their 
platforms and introducing product improvements. 
 Plan for the integration of MRAP vehicles into the fleet mixes. 
 Emphasize a mixed fleet approach that spans the “iron triangle” of 
protection, payload, and performance. 
 Transition to a fleet of tactical vehicles that have scalable protection 
(integrated A-kit and add-on-armor B kits)” (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2010, p. 19–20). 
The latest Army TWV strategy continues to evolve to include a possible long 
term role for the M-ATV, but does not definitively state if the JLTV will replace the M-
ATV or if they will complement each other. The Army states: “A large portion of the 
MRAP FoVs, including the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV), will supplement the 
LTV requirements either as a bridge to fill critical combat roles (until the JLTV is fully 
fielded and/or the remainder of the MRAP FoV EUL), or as permanent enduring 
capabilities” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2010, p. 8). While the Army’s TWV strategy 
is somewhat vaguely worded about the future of the M-ATV, the Army and the Marines 
are more optimistic about expanding the future roles of the JLTV. GAO (2011) points 
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out: “As a part of DoD’s planned analysis of alternatives to the Joint Light Tactical 
Vehicle, the Army and Marine Corps have stated they will explore the implications, 
including maintenance and life cycle cost benefits, of acquiring a Joint Light Tactical 
Vehicle family of vehicles as a part of a mixed vehicle fleet” (p. 33). 
Erwin, a columnist for National Defense magazine, echoes many of the arguments 
made by the GAO about the need for a comprehensive DoD TWV strategy: “In 
deliberations over how to modernize the fleet, the $36 billion already poured into MRAP 
is the elephant in the room. That equates to almost half the value of the entire $70 billion 
Army fleet of 266,000 trucks” (2011, paragraph 5). Erwin is critical about the services’ 
inability to decide if the M-ATV will remain in the TWV fleet or if it will be replaced. 
“The services have yet to offer details on whether MRAP will become a “program of 
record” that will stay permanently in the inventory after current wars are over” 
(paragraph 6). She points to multiple TWV programs currently being funded as part of 
the problem:  
Discussions over how to move forward have been paralyzed by the fact 
that there are so many programs—JLTV, MRAP, the MRAP all-terrain 
vehicle, a next-generation Marine Corps personnel carrier, new production 
Humvees and upgrades for Humvees—that are competing for the same 
light tactical vehicle mission role. “That’s what’s got people unable to 
make decisions,” the industry source says (paragraph 9).  
She fears that the decreasing defense budget could result in the JLTV program being 
canceled, and says “The speculation is that MRAPs, or possibly the lighter “all-terrain” 
variant, could end up crushing JLTV in future budget drills” (paragraph 6). 
The Army’s latest TWV strategy is ambiguous about how important a role the M-
ATV will play, but a reader could understand why some may fear a decreasing budget 
would result in the JLTV program being canceled. Some of the statements in the Army’s 
TWV strategy include “MRAP FoV integrated into the Army force structure to take 
advantage of existing systems to meet documented requirements and to reduce operating 
costs by divestment of duplicative systems” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2010, p. 4) 
and “shape TWV fleet size and mix to ensure long-term affordability through new 
procurement, recapitalization and divestment; leverage existing assets to the greatest 
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extent” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2010, p. 5). As a part of the existing assets the 
Army plans to leverage, it is important to note the Army already has thousands of M-
ATVs. As Erwin (2011) writes: “As of June 2010, the Army had more than 19,800 M-
ATV and MRAP vehicles in overseas war zones and in the United States. The Marine 
Corps has a combined MRAP and M-ATV fleet of about 3,300 vehicles” (paragraph 22). 
D. RECAPITALIZATION 
Many recommendations and proposals for how to modernize the TWV fleet 
include recapitalizing the existing HMMWV fleet. Feickert, a specialist in military 
ground vehicles for the Congressional Research Service, examines this point in detail 
weighing both the pros and cons. While the JLTV is designed to replace the HMMWV 
the DoD does not see a requirement to replace all of the existing HMMWVs. Feickert 
(2012) notes: “DoD officials have emphasized that JLTVs are not intended to replace 
HMMWVs “one for one” (p. 1). 
Recapitalization involves refitting and modernizing an existing vehicle to 
essentially bring its mileage back to zero and renewing its useful life. It is a cost effective 
method of updating the TWV fleet. GAO (2010) points out: “Begun in 2004, 
approximately 30,000 vehicles have been recapitalized at a cost of approximately 
35 percent of the value of a new production light-utility vehicle” (p. 20). However, 
modernizing HMMWVs to meet the existing need may be impossible. Feickert (2012) 
notes:  “The Army contends that adding additional armor puts significant stress on 
engine, suspension and transmission equipment, requiring extensive and costly 
modification to these vehicles” (p. 11). 
While recapitalizing HMMWVs is cheaper than buying new vehicles, the services 
are anticipating the per-unit cost of the JLTV to be similar to the cost of recapitalizing 
HMMWVs. Feickert (2012) makes the point: 
With the proposed target cost for the JLTV in the $230,000-$270,000 
range, some defense officials suggest that the JLTV could reach cost 
parity with recapitalized HMMWVs. The Marine Corps is reportedly not 
releasing a Request for Proposal (RFP) for HMMWV recapitalization 
(recap) noting that: 
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When you start trying to bring those capabilities back into the [HMMWV] 
recap, your price goes up to the $240,000 to $250,000 range, and now 
you’re at [the price of] a JLTV vehicle, which has so much more payload 
and so much more capability. 
Army program officials contend that some recapitalized HMMWV 
versions could cost as much as $500,000 per vehicle. Analysts also 
suggest that a new JLTV will have a much greater operational life than a 
“used” recapitalized HMMWV. Given these considerations, Congress 
might decide to further examine how the new proposed target cost for the 
JLTV in the $230,000- $270,000 range affects current and future 
HMMWV recapitalization efforts.” (p. 11) 
Given this information, congressional officials began to wonder if recapitalization 
efforts for the HMMWV are worth the expense. One Army recapitalization program was 
denied by Congress, which seemed to indicate Congress was no longer willing to fund 
recapitalization efforts. “Because the Army’s requested reprogramming action has been 
denied by the Congress, all recapitalization plans have been suspended pending the 
development of revised plans for the HMMWV production and recapitalization 
programs” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010, pp. 20–21). Following that 
announcement, Army officials decided to cancel other recapitalization efforts as well. 
Beidel, a columnist for National Defense Magazine, notes: “The Army recently 
announced the termination of a program to recapitalize a portion of the Humvee fleet that 
would have covered about 6,000 trucks” (2012, paragraph 3). This was a clear sign that 
DoD officials now intended to replace HMMWVs with JLTVs to the fullest extent 
possible. In Beidel’s words, Defense Department officials “are throwing their support 
behind the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle as a replacement for the trucks, some of which 
have been in service since the 1980s” (2012, paragraph 2). 
E. LONG-TERM FUNDING 
The availability of long-term funding is the key to keeping any acquisition 
program alive. Many factors are involved in deciding to fund an acquisition program like 
the JLTV, and these areas are addressed in detail by the GAO (2011), Erwin (2011), 
Feickert (2012), and Goodman (2011) who is the senior editor of the Journal of 
Electronic Defense.  
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One of the major difficulties is predicting a unit cost. The Army has been fairly 
consistent in expecting the JLTV unit cost to be about $300,000. “The cost per vehicle is 
not yet determined, but it is expected to exceed $300 thousand without the inclusion of 
mission equipment” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2010, p. 7). The Army attempts to 
soften the blow of such a high cost by comparing it to a similar vehicle. “It is estimated 
that each JLTV will cost in excess of $300 thousand before equipping with essential 
combat systems—but not as high as the cost of the MRAP Family of Vehicles (FoV) 
which cost $430–$900 thousand apiece to procure” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2010, 
p. 3).  
Erwin (2011) points out that predicting a unit cost depends on what you include in 
that cost. Some estimates include only the vehicle, while others include the necessary 
vehicle equipment. Referencing GAO’s Michael J. Sullivan, Erwin claims: 
Production funding is currently projected to start in fiscal year 2013. 
Through fiscal year 2015, the services are predicting they will need $2.7 
billion for JLTV procurement. The program’s total acquisition costs could 
be substantial, he said. The target unit-production cost ranges from 
$306,000 to $332,000, depending on vehicle category. That compares to 
the base M-ATV unit price of about $445,000. Armor kits and mission 
equipment packages are additional. As a reference point, the cost of 
government-furnished equipment averaged $532,000 per vehicle for the 
M-ATVs. If similar costs apply to JLTV, its procurement unit cost could 
be in excess of $800,000, GAO estimated (paragraph 18).  
The GAO (2011) expects the total acquisition cost of the JLTV to exceed $18.5 billion. 
“While acquisition costs for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle are yet to be determined, a 
low-end estimate is $18.5 billion. The cost per unit, including mission equipment, could 
be over $800,000 each” (p. 31). 
Long-term funding must consider the cost of the vehicle over its whole life, 
including recapitalization. For a comparison on the cost of recapitalization, the Army 
compares it to the rest of its TWV fleet. “The annualized cost to replace each of our 
current vehicles every 40 years, with a recapitalization performed mid-way, is over 
$2 billion/year and over $2.5 billion/year if MRAPs are included. If the Army were to  
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replace all HMMWVs with JLTVs, this would add over $2–$5 billion/year to these 
estimates, depending on the procurement rate” (U.S. Department of the Army, 2010, 
p. 4). 
When speaking about JLTV unit cost, one must also consider M-ATV unit costs. 
The GAO points out: “The estimated total acquisition cost for the Mine Resistant 
Ambush Protected All-Terrain Vehicle is about $12.5 billion” (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2011, p. 31). The life cycle costs of the M-ATV must be 
considered as well. The GAO also notes: “While the cost to operate and sustain the 
vehicles [MRAPs] for their expected service life will depend on the military services’ 
specific plans to integrate the vehicles into their force structures, the MRAP joint 
program office estimates that the cost to operate and maintain the vehicles through 2024 
will be about $10.8 billion” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010, pp. 21–22).  
Another large factor to consider when deciding to fund an acquisition program is 
risk. Once a service starts to lose interest in a program due to doubts of the program’s 
possibility of success, it is a clear sign the program is experiencing more risk than the 
service is willing to accept. Erwin (2011) points to one clear indication; “JLTV has 
floundered recently, as the Marine Corps soured on the vehicle for being too heavy. Its 
estimated price tag of nearly half-a-million dollars per truck has made it all that much 
more certain that if the services end up buying JLTV, it will be in smaller numbers than 
industry had hoped” (paragraph 4). The GAO identified risk in this same area in a 
2010 report.  “This category of JLTV vehicles [JLTV Force Application category] is at 
risk of not meeting the transportability requirement due to their projected weight and the 
projected requirement for reliability is two to three times greater than other tactical 
vehicles” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). 
The U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee in 2011 decided the JLTV program 
was riskier than they were willing to accept. Feickert (2012) explains:  
On September 13, 2011, the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee 
recommended the termination of JLTV program, noting “excessive cost 
growth and constantly changing requirements” suggesting that 
“alternatives exist today to meet the Army and Marine Corps’ 
requirements to recapitalize and competitively upgrade the HMMWV 
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fleet.” The subcommittee expressed concern that early program cost 
growth and projected acquisition costs will make the program 
unaffordable in a challenging economic environment. (p. 5) 
In some cases, when an acquisition program is at risk of being canceled, the 
services find a way to reduce the program risk in order to make it a more attractive 
investment. Feickert (2012) identifies how the Army and Marines did just that in the case 
of the JLTV: 
In what has been characterized as a response to the Senate Appropriations 
Committee recommendation to terminate the JLTV, the Army and 
Marines apparently put aside past differences and developed a new 
acquisition strategy that relaxes transportability requirements and sets a 
goal for a lower per-unit cost of $225,000. The Army notes this lower 
price tag is a result of requirement trade-offs but crew survivability 
remains of paramount importance.” (p. 5)  
This does not mean the JLTV is no longer considered a risky investment. When 
submitting its budget proposal for fiscal year 2012, the Army included funding that will 
allow it to take the JLTV into the EMD phase of the acquisition process. Delays in the 
schedule were considered by the appropriations committee, as Feickert (2012) points out: 
“The conference recommended reducing the Army’s $172.1 million budget request by 
$64.8 million due to ‘schedule slip’ (delay of awarding the EMD contract) and reducing 
the Marines’ $71.8 million request by $24.9 million for the same reason” (p. 9). When 
the Army presented a restructured schedule that would allow for a fast acquisition 
process, the conference responded again. “Recognizing the renewed focus and approach, 
the conference agreement provides $87,300,000 in Research, Development, Test and 
Evaluation, Army and $46,700,000 in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, 
Navy for continued JLTV development, in accordance with revised estimates for the 
program” (Feickert, 2012, p. 9). 
Investing in acquisition programs like the JLTV requires enormous resources. 
When deciding to invest in a program, the services are also deciding to not invest in other 
programs. The smaller the pool of resources becomes, the more difficult the decisions 
become. Feickert (2012) identifies how the Marines plan to deal with the threat of budget 
reductions: 
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Marine leaders reportedly testified to the House Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces on November 16, 2011, 
that if significant budget cuts are enacted due to sequestration of the 
defense budget under the provisions of the Budget Control Act of 2011, 
P.L. 112–25, the Marines would defer acquisition of the JLTV until the 
late 2020s. The Marines would instead develop and procure the 
Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) before acquiring any JLTVs. Experts 
suggest that if the Marines defer until the late 2020s that the per vehicle 
cost for the Army’s JLTVs—that it hopes to begin procuring in 2015—
would increase and possibly endanger the overall program. (p. 6)  
The threat of drastically shrinking budgets has spurred many studies about how to deal 
with the reduced resources. Feickert (2012) finds another example of how the JLTV may 
end up on the chopping block: 
A number of think tanks and commissions—including the presidentially- 
appointed Bowles-Simpson Fiscal Commission37—who are proposing 
ways to decrease DoD spending have recommended the JLTV program be 
cancelled or deferred. Given this wide-ranging opposition to the JLTV 
program on the basis of affordability, even a $230,000 per copy JLTV 
variant might prove to be difficult to justify.” (p. 10)  
Even if defense budgets remain unaffected by the Budget Control Act of 2011, the 
Marines recognize that the cost of the JLTV means they cannot have as many as they 
want. The GAO points out: “Marine Corps officials acknowledged that the projected cost 
to sustain their tactical vehicle fleet contributed to a decision to reduce the quantities of 
tactical vehicles by 30 percent over the next few years” (2010, p. 22). 
F. CAPABILITIES 
To understand the complexity of these vehicles, and why they cost so much, we 
must understand what the M-ATV and JLTV are capable of, and what they are expected 
to do. Many requirements on the JLTV in particular constrain each other. For example, it 
must be able to have high enough ground clearance to perform well off-road, but must be 
short enough to fit inside the Navy’s amphibious ships. They must be light enough to be 
carried by helicopters, but have enough armor protection to allow the passengers to 
survive an IED blast. This section looks at the capabilities of the two vehicles and the 
challenges they pose. 
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The most difficult technical problem the JLTV needs to overcome is weight. 
Erwin (2011) offers a comparison of three TWVs: “An M-ATV weighs 32,500 pounds, 
compared to 12,000 to 15,000 pounds for a Humvee and about 20,000 to 24,000 for 
JLTV” (paragraph 17). The weight of the M-ATV means it is not capable of doing some 
of the things the JLTV is required to be able to do. The JLTVs weight is taking its toll as 
well. Feickert (2012) illustrates how the weight of the vehicle is causing the program to 
be scaled back: “The Category B variant was eliminated because it proved to be too 
heavy to meet the required weight of approximately 15,639 pounds to make it 
transportable by Army CH-47F and Marine Corps CH-53K helicopters” (p. 3). 
“Originally, there were three variants, but now there are two planned JLTV variants: a 
four-passenger Combat Tactical Vehicle (CTV) and a two-passenger Combat Support 
Vehicle CSV)” (p. 1).  
Related to the JLTVs weight is its armor protection capabilities. The JLTV is 
designed to have MRAP-like armor protection. Goodman (2011) explains how the JLTV 
demonstrated this capability during the TD phase of the acquisition process: 
The services completed all planned performance and RAM testing; 
however, because of the increased requirement in under-body 
survivability, more challenging ballistic testing was conducted to  
help inform the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) 
phase requirements. Additionally, JLTV’s first helicopter sling  
load transportability test with the Army’s CH-47D and the USMC’s CH-
53E was completed with General Purpose, four-passenger vehicles. 
(paragraph 3).  
The JLTV will have the ability to operate with less armor when the situation allows, and 
be able to bolt on more armor when necessary. Goodman (2011) continues:  
The JLTV will feature inherent and B-kit scalable armor. The vehicle’s 
inherent armor protection levels, sufficient for non-combat humanitarian 
operations, will be supplemented by the addition of bolt-on B-kit armor 
for enhanced protection on combat missions. All three industry teams are 
using modular B-kit armor panels made of advanced lightweight 
composite materials instead of metal to keep weight down while providing 
ballistic, mine, and IED protection. (Crew Protection Imperative, 
paragraph. 2)  
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Still, armor protection is one area where it is difficult to find a good balance. As the 
enemy increases its capabilities, the Army reacts. Feickert (2012) notes: “In February 
2011, the JLTV Program Office announced that the award of the EMD contract would be 
delayed until January or February 2012 because the Army changed requirements for the 
JLTV to have the same level of under body protection as the Mine-Resistant, Ambush-
Protected All-Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV)” (p. 3). 
Armor protection is the nemesis of a vehicle with a weight requirement. Even 
without the weight requirement, heavy vehicles experience reduced performance. 
Goodman (2011) explains how weight killed the HMMWV: 
Up-armoring of HMMWVs through the addition of armor plates provided 
increased protection, but the increased weight reduced the vehicle’s 
payload capacity, maneuverability, off-road mobility, and air 
transportability. With the JLTV, the Army and Marine Corps hope to 
regain the performance once offered by the HMMWV while adding 
inherent crew protection against IED-like threats. (Crew Protection 
Imperative, paragraph 1)   
The JLTV will experience increased performance in other areas as well. Goodman (2011) 
details the JLTVs performance:  
The JLTVs also improve payload efficiency through chassis engineering, 
enabling the vehicles to be deployed with the appropriate amount of force 
protection through scalable armor solutions. Further, expected JLTV fleet 
reliability and fuel efficiency will be significantly greater than the current 
HMMWV fleet, which will reap millions of dollars in savings over the 
JLTV life cycle. (paragraph 6)  
Beyond automotive capability, the JLTV will have features that no other combat tactical 
vehicles currently have. Goodman (2011) explains the electronics package: 
The JLTV will feature an open electronics architecture that will facilitate 
integration of future sensor, communications, and navigation systems as 
they become available. As a result, the JLTV’s crew will have 
significantly improved battlefield situational awareness compared with 
vehicles today. (Vehicle Configurations, paragraph 4) 
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G. ACQUISITION STRUCTURE  
Before the JLTV can start benefitting the war-fighter, it must successfully 
complete the acquisition process. Feickert (2012), Goodman (2011), and John-Givens 
(2012) who is a strategic communications officer for the Program Executive Office, 
Combat Support and Combat Service Support, track the JLTV through the acquisition 
phases and milestones. Feickert (2012) gives a quick overview: 
The JLTV is an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program. The Army 
bears the overall responsibility for developing the JLTV through its Joint 
Program Office within the Army’s Tank, Automotive, and Armament 
Command (TACOM) in Warren, MI. Marine participation is centered on a 
program office under the supervision of the Program Executive Officer 
Land Systems (PEO LS) Marine Corps at Quantico, VA. (p. 1–2)  
The most recent phase the JLTV completed was the Technology Development 
phase. Successful completion of this phase was critical to reaching milestone B. John-
Givens (2012) describes the JLTVs progress: 
In the spring of 2011, JLTV successfully completed a 27-month 
Technology Development, or TD, phase -- satisfying its intended purpose 
of demonstrating the integration of mature technologies as a complete 
system and providing the Army and the Marine Corps with an assessment 
of the technical, performance cost and schedule risks relevant to entering 
the Engineering and Manufacturing Development, or EMD, Phase. 
(paragraph 6)  
Goodman (2011) supplements the progress and looks toward the next phase: 
The TD phase has satisfied its intended purposes: demonstrate the 
integration of mature technologies as a complete system and provide an 
assessment of the technical and performance risks relevant to entering the 
EMD phase. The EMD phase will be a full and open competition, with the 
selection of multiple offers. Milestone B is currently scheduled for 2nd 
quarter of FY 12. (paragraph 7)  
Looking toward the next phase, the Army is prepared to request proposals from 
industry. Feickert (2012) notes:  
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“On October 3, 2011, the Army issued a draft Request for Proposal (RFP) for the 
Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. Key provisions include 
 a $230,000 to $270,000 per vehicle cost target; 
 an additional add-on armor kit (called a B kit) can cost no more than 
$50,000; 
 EMD phase cut by 16 months—will now be 32 versus 48 months; and 
 Army intends to procure at least 20,000 JLTVs with options to procure 
more.” (p. 6) 
In order to insure the JTLV completes the acquisition process in a timely manner, 
officials have restructured the EMD phase and shortened the total time requirement. “The 
refined 27-month acquisition strategy is designed to put a premium on driving down 
costs, reducing risk and getting vehicles into the hands of warfighters quickly. The JLTV 
EMD contract period of performance for contractors is 27-months, while the full EMD 
phase will last for 33-months as the program offices ensures JLTV moves successfully 
from Milestone B to Milestone C” (John-Givens, 2012, paragraph 9). To facilitate the 
award of EMD contracts, the Army must have the budget authority to pay for such 
contracts. With this knowledge in mind, Feickert (2012) demonstrates the Army is ready 
to move forward: 
The FY2012 Budget Request for JLTVs is $172.1 million for Army 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $71.8 million 
for Marine Corps RDT&E, for a program total of $243.9 million. The 
significant increase from the FY2011 Budget Request of $84.7 million 
reflects the anticipated award of the EMD contracts in January or February 
2012. (p. 9)  
The Army expects to build the first production model JLTVs in fiscal year 2015. “The 
Low Rate Initial Production of the JLTV is expected to start no earlier than FY15” (U.S. 




H. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter provides a review of the studies addressing the issues around the 
acquisition of the JLTV and the M-ATV. It provides the reader with the background 
knowledge necessary to better understand the approach taken in this thesis and to 
interpret the results.  The next chapter details the methodology used in this thesis to 
identify the optimum ratio of the two vehicles to be purchased to minimize costs while 











This thesis builds an optimization decision model that can be used to determine 
the optimum ratio of JLTVs and M-ATVs the Army and Marine Corps can purchase to 
minimize costs while taking into account all the constraints related to each vehicle’s 
capabilities, required off-road capabilities and transport ease for missions supported by 
the services. In this thesis, the “optimum” ratio is the ratio that best meets the needs of 
the services while minimizing production costs. The JLTV and M-ATV are wheeled 
tactical vehicles that share many capabilities and play very similar roles. The level of 
duplication in the capabilities of these vehicles leads to questions if the redundancy can 
be limited in order to save cost.  
This thesis uses a non-linear programming optimization decision model to achieve 
an optimum ratio of the two vehicles. The methodology behind the non-linear 
programming optimization model proposed in this thesis is described below.  
B. DECISION MODELING 
Non-linear programming optimization decision models are a type of mathematical 
programming, part of a larger practice called decision modeling.   The Render, Stair and 
Balakrishnan textbook, “Managerial Decision Modeling With Spreadsheets,” defines 
decision modeling as “a scientific approach to managerial decision making” (2003, p. 3). 
Using a systematic scientific approach and mathematical tools to solve decision problems 
minimizes bias and guesswork in finding the solution to decision problems.  
Mathematical programming is the most widely used decision modeling technique. 
It is used to identify the optimum choice amongst potentially thousands of decision 
possibilities. Mathematical programming usually deals with identifying the optimum 
allocation of limited resources, subject to various constraints.  
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In general, decision models are categorized into two types, deterministic and 
probabilistic models, based on whether the data used in the decision making process is 
known with certainty or not. Deterministic models, as described by Render et al. (2003), 
“assume that all the relevant input data are known with certainty; that is, they assume that 
all the information needed for modeling the decision-making problem environment is 
available, with fixed and known values” (p. 5). For probabilistic models, not all the data 
used in the decision model are known with certainty. Defined by Render et al. (2003), 
“probabilistic models assume that some input data are not known with certainty. That is 
they assume that the values of some input variables will not be known before decisions 
are made” (p. 5).  
The data used in this thesis is not processed using probabilities; therefore the type 
of decision model this thesis utilizes is a deterministic model. However, uncertainty can 
be incorporated into the decision model. This thesis addresses some potential for 
uncertainty by conducting sensitivity analysis, as described in detail in Chapter V.    
C. MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING COMPONENTS 
There are four components to a mathematical programming decision model, 
described below. 
1. The Decision Variables  
The decision variables are the variables that are adjusted within the model in 
order to determine the optimal solution. Decision models answer questions such as “how 
many” and “what is the cost (or profit) value considering the values of the decision 
variables in the optimum solution” Decision variables typically answer the “how many” 
question. For example, if product A sells for $100, and it requires 1 hour of machine 
time, and product B sells for $200, and requires 1.5 hours of machine time, how many of 
product A and how many of product B should the producer make in order to minimize 
cost (or maximize profit )? In this example, A and B are the decision variables, as they 
answer the question: “how many?” 
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2. The Objective Function   
The objective function is the mathematically expressed component of the model 
that seeks to maximize or minimize some quantity. Render et al. (2003) describe 
objective functions very clearly. 
All problems seek to maximize or minimize some quantity, usually profit 
or cost. We refer to this property as the objective function. For example, 
the objective of a typical manufacture is to maximize profits. In the case of 
a trucking or railroad distribution system, the objective might be to 
minimize shipping costs. In any event, this objective must be stated clearly 
and defined mathematically. (p. 26) 
Profits and costs are determined by incorporating a mathematical function of the 
decision variables. The function is linear in decision variables for what are called “linear 
programming models,” and non-linear in decision variables for so-classed “non-linear 
programming models.”  
As an example, total costs from combined production of A and B = (cost per unit 
A* number of units A + cost per unit B* number of units B). 
The cost per unit A and B, respectively, are the coefficients of the objective 
function in this example, using a cost minimization objective function .The objective 
function used in the model developed in this thesis is non-linear. Details are provided in 
Chapter IV. 
3. The Constraints 
The constraints are the restrictions within which the model must operate. Render 
et al. (2003) explain constraints as follows: 
LP models usually contain restrictions, or constraints, that limit the degree 
to which we can pursue our objective. For example, when we are trying to 
decide how many units to produce of each product in a firm’s line, we are 
restricted by the available machinery time. Likewise, in selecting food 
items for a hospital meal, a dietitian must ensure that minimum daily 
requirements of vitamins, proteins, and so on are satisfied. We want, 
therefore, to maximize or minimize a quantity (the objective) subject to 
limited resources (the constraints) (p. 26).  
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The constraints are typically expressed mathematically as linear functions of 
decision variables. This is also the case for the constraints incorporated in the model built 
in this thesis. 
4. The Optimum Solution 
The optimum solution is the set of values the decision variables take to insure the 
optimization of the objective function while satisfying the constraints of the model. In a 
cost minimization model, the optimum solution is the set of values for each decision 
variable that minimize total costs while meeting the constraints of the available resources.  
The size and scope of mathematical programming problems require the use of 
computer applications to identify the optimum solution to any optimization problem. This 
thesis uses Microsoft Excel’s Solver add-in package to implement the decision model and 
to identify the numerical optimum solution to the optimization problem. 
D. STEPS IN CONDUCTING MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING 
ANALYSIS  
Mathematical programming analysis, as described by Render et al. (2003), is 
broken into three distinct steps: formulation, solution, interpretation and sensitivity 
analysis, addressing “what if” questions to ensure robustness of the solution and 
recommendations based on the solutions.  
1. Formulation 
The formulation phase is the process of using mathematical formulas to frame the 
problem. Render et al. (2003) explain, “Formulation is the process by which each aspect 
of the problem scenario is translated and expressed in terms of simple mathematical 
expressions, taken together, completely addresses all the issues relevant to the problem 
situation at hand (p. 26)” Specifically, the formulation includes the definition and 




The solution phase identifies the optimum solution that optimizes the objective 
function while satisfying the constraints. Given the size and computational complexity of 
most optimization decision models, computer programs are generally used to implement 
the mathematical model and to identify the solution of the model. This thesis uses 
Microsoft Excel’s Solver add-in package for academic use.  
3. Interpretation and Sensitivity Analysis 
The interpretation and sensitivity analysis phase allows the user to interpret the 
results and understand how changes in the input data would affect the results. Render et 
al. (2003) explain:  
Assuming the formulation is correct and has been successfully 
implemented and solved using an LP software package, how does a 
manager use the results? In addition to just providing the solution to the 
current LP problem, the computer results also allow the manager to 
evaluate the impact of several different types of what-if questions 
regarding the problem (p. 26) 
Sensitivity analysis asks “What if” questions that enable the user to understand 
how   the optimum solution of the model changes if any one given data used in the model 
changes. Sensitivity analysis is particularly important for validating the recommendation 
based on the optimum solution of the optimization model. By conducting sensitivity 
analysis, the decision maker checks the robustness of the optimum results of the 
optimization model, and, therefore, the robustness of the recommendation made based on 
the results of the optimization model.   
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IV. THE MODEL 
This chapter details the main elements of the non-linear programming 
optimization model used in this thesis to identify the optimum number of M-ATVs and 
JLTVs to be procured to minimize costs while taking into account a host of constraints 
related to the two vehicles capabilities. 
A. DECISION VARIABLES 
There are two decision variables in this thesis’s model. The first is the quantity of 
JLTVs the Army and Marine Corps could procure; the second is the quantity of M-ATVs 
the Army and Marine Corps could procure. The goal of this model is to identify the 
optimum ratio of JLTVs and M-ATVs the Army and Marine Corps could procure.  
B. OBJECTIVE FUNCTION 
The objective function in this thesis is designed to minimize the combined 
procurement costs of the JLTV and the M-ATV. This model is a cost minimization 
decision programming model. The mathematical formula that describes the objective 
function used is as follows:  
Minimum Production Cost = (Cumulative Average Cost JLTV * # JLTV 
Produced) + (Cumulative Average Cost M-ATV * # M-ATV Produced) 
The objective function contains cumulative average costs for both, the JLTV and 
the M-ATV. The cumulative average cost per vehicle is not a parameter of a given value, 
but rather a function of the number of vehicles produced. Specifically, as the quantity of 
vehicles increases, the average unit cost decreases due to the learning curve. 
Learning Curve Theory originated in the 1920s in the aircraft industry, and can be 
referred to by many other names. The Defense Acquisition University lists the common 
names for Learning Curve Theory as experience curve, cost curve, or cost improvement 
curve. Learning curve theory is well explained by the Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) publication BCF106 Fundamentals of Cost Analysis. The following quote 
explains the basic concept of learning curve theory, and is taken form BCF106: 
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The general learning curve theory states that as the number of units 
produced doubles, the unit cost decreases in a predictable pattern. It is 
generally accepted that when a new task is undertaken, you learn while 
actually performing the task. The more often the task is repeated, the more 
efficient you become at performing the task, and the time required to 
perform the task decreases. Whether we are speaking of time or money, 
this means that each unit costs less than the preceding unit. 
The idea behind Learning Curve Theory is that the greater the quantity of 
something that an organization produces, the less expensive it becomes to produce each 
subsequent unit. It is believed that workers and managers become better at producing the 
product, while tooling and production methods improve as well. BCF106 credits the first 
publication utilizing learning curve research to T.P. Wright in 1936 in the Journal of the 
Aeronautical Sciences, “Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes.” 
Learning curve theory can be used either as unit formulation or cumulative 
average cost. Unit formulation can be used to estimate the cost a particular unit, for 
example, the 100th vehicle. Cumulative average cost can be used to estimate the average 
unit cost of a batch of units, for example, the average unit cost of units 1–100. 
The formula for the cumulative average cost is YN = A*N^b where: 
           YN =  the average cost of N units 
      A =  the theoretical cost of the first unit 
      N =  the cumulative number of units produced 
      b =  a constant representing the slope of the learning curve 
In this thesis’s model, A for the JLTV is $10,000,000 and A for the M-ATV is 
$8,000,000. These figures were derived using multiple cost estimates that were published 
in the media (GAO 2010; GAO Testimony, 2011; Erwin, 2011), and then using algebra 
to solve for A. N for each vehicle is provided by Microsoft Excel’s solver program as it 
searches for the optimum number of each vehicle to produce. The slope, b, for each is 
–0.321928095, which represents a learning curve slope of 80%.  Eighty percent was 
chosen by the author of this thesis based on the author’s understanding of the 
labor/automation ratio present in the production processes of these vehicles. Actual 
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percentages for these two vehicles were not available to the author, but can be modified 
by the user of the model as more accurate information becomes available. 
Solving the cumulative average cost equations yields the YN of each vehicle. YN 
then gets multiplied by N to get the total cost of producing N vehicles, and the two are 
summed up together to get the combined cost of producing N JLTVs and N M-ATVs. 
This is the optimized result of the objective function. Microsoft Excel’s Solver function 
seeks the optimum N for each vehicle to minimize the total cost. 
This thesis becomes a non-linear model because the coefficients in the objective 
function are raised to powers other than one. Graphically expressed, they both would 
form curved lines. 
Based on the description of the cumulative average cost functions, the 
mathematical formula that describes the objective function becomes: 
Minimum Production Cost = Cost of first unit of JLTV*# JLTV Produced 
raised by the slope of learning curve for producing JLTVs) + (Cost of first 
unit of M-ATVs* # M-ATV Produced squared raised by the slope of 
learning curve for producing M-ATVs). 
C. CONSTRAINTS 
The constraints are entered as mathematical formulas that represent the actual 
limitations of the scenario being modeled. Typically, the constraints represent resource 
limitations. The model in this thesis has six constraints. An explanation of the grading 
and assumptions follow after each constraint and formula, as described below. 
Only a positive number of M-ATVs and JLTVs can be produced. This is known 
as a non-negativity constraint. 
Given that a grade on 10 out of 10 is assigned for transportability for the JLTV, 
and a grade of 5 out of 10 for the M-ATV based on the inability of the M-
ATV to be carried by a CH-47 or CH-53 helicopter, the mixture of the two 
must have a minimum average grade of 7 out of 10. A mix grade of 7 is a 
starting point. The user of the model can adjust the mix grade to suit their 
needs. The constraint is expressed as follows:  
3(#JLTV) – 2(#M-ATV) ≥ 0 
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Given that a grade of 7 out of 10 is assigned for the off-road capability of the 
JLTV and 5 out of 10 for the M-ATV, the mixture of the two must have a 
minimum average of grade of 6 out of 10, expressed as follows: 
(#JLTV) – (#M-ATV) ≥ 0 
The minimum number of M-ATVs to be produced must be 1, expressed as 
follows: 
#M-ATV ≥ 1 
The minimum number of JLTVs to be produced must be 1, expressed as follows: 
#JLTV ≥ 1 
The mixture of vehicles must equal a minimum of 90,000 total units, expressed as 
follows: 
#JLTV + #M-ATV ≥ 90,000 
This thesis assigns grades on a scale of 1 to-10, with 10 being the best, to the 
transportability and off-road capability of these two vehicles. The JLTV is assigned a 
grade of 10 for transportability because it will be transportable via all methods desired by 
the Army and Marine Corps. Most importantly, the JLTV will be light enough to be 
carried by CH-47 and CH-53 helicopters. The M-ATV is too heavy to be transported via 
helicopter. This significantly degrades the military’s ability to quickly move the vehicle 
from place to place via air. If a vehicle breaks down in a remote combat zone, it is usually 
safer to fly the vehicle out for repairs than to drive a convoy out to retrieve it. For these 
reasons, this thesis assigns a grade of 5 to the M-ATV for transportability. 
This thesis uses the same 1-to-10 scale to grade the two vehicles on their off-road 
capability. Both vehicles are designed to perform well on off-highway conditions, but the 
JLTV’s chassis and suspension are receiving additional attention that the M-ATV was not 
afforded. The considerable weight of both vehicles will still affect their off-road 
performance, but the JLTV’s lighter weight, chassis and suspension improvements should 
give it an advantage of road over the M-ATV. This thesis assigns a grade of 7 out of 10 to 
the JLTV and 5 out of 10 to the M-ATV for off-road capability.  
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The transportability and off-road capability constraints are converted into 
formulas that yield an average grade. The average grade for transportability is 7 and the 
average grade for off-road capability is 5. These average grades are used because they 
split the difference between the two constraints. A future researcher can easily modify the 
average grades if they feel the average grade of the fleet should be weighted closer to the 
more capable vehicle, or the less capable vehicle. This thesis shows in Chapter IV how 
adjusting the average grade affects the optimization model’s results. 
The quantity of light tactical wheeled vehicles the services expect to procure has 
changed several times over the past few years and will likely change several more times 
as the defense budget is reduced and the war in Afghanistan draws down. The actual 
quantity of vehicles the model proposes to build is set as a minimum number as a 
constraint. Without this constraint, the cost minimizing model will find it least expensive 
to build one vehicle that meets or exceeds the minimum grades. In this example, the 
model would find that building one JLTV is optimum. This thesis sets the minimum 
number of vehicles at 90,000, which approximates the original expectation of the total 
quantity of vehicles the services would procure. The quantity of vehicles procured will 
affect the unit cost of the vehicles and the total cost of purchasing the vehicles. As the 
quantity decreases the total cost will decrease, but the per-unit costs will increase. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This model utilized in this thesis uses well-established techniques in the decision 
modeling and learning theory disciplines to offer a decision tool useful for determining 
the optimum ratio of M-ATVs and JLTVs the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps can 
purchase to minimize costs while reducing redundancy and achieving the desired level of 
capability  
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V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. DATA 
The results produced by any decision model depend in large part on the data and 
assumptions built into the model. However, the results are less important than what they 
teach us about how adjustments in the data affect the results. The model developed in this 
thesis is meant as a tool for incorporating different scenarios in the decision making 
process, and to evaluate how each scenario affects decision making.  
In this thesis, there are several assumptions made that can be adjusted or 
manipulated to fit any scenario. First, an assumption is made that the learning curve in 
the production process for the vehicles is the same for both vehicles. The similarities of 
the two vehicles indicate the production processes will be very similar. Similar 
production processes will have similar learning curves. Learning curve percentages are 
based on production processes, especially the amount of labor involved in the process. 
The more automated the production process, the higher the learning curve percentage. An 
80% learning curve means every time the production quantity is doubled, the average unit 
cost is reduced by 20%. In this model, it is assumed that there is an 80% learning curve 
for both vehicles.  
The second assumption made is an estimate of the theoretical first unit costs for 
both vehicles. Using the cumulative average cost formula, algebra, and media estimates 
about the unit costs and production quantities of each vehicle, the theoretical first unit 
cost estimates are $10 million for the JLTV and $8 million for the M-ATV. 
The final assumptions made were in regard to the assignment of grades to the 
vehicles. A grading system that is based on a scale of 1-to-10 is used, with 10 being the 
best. A grade is assigned to each vehicle in the areas of transportability and off-road 
capability. The critical element that affected the grades in both of these areas is vehicle 
weight. The JLTV can be transported via CH-47 and CH-53 helicopters. The M-ATV 
cannot be transported by either of these helicopters because it is too heavy. Media 
reviews and indications as to how each vehicle fares off road were somewhat based on 
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chassis design, but in the end the lighter vehicle is slightly more agile and capable off 
road. For transportability, a 10 grade is assigned for the JLTV, and a 5 for the M-ATV. 
For off-road capability, a 7 grade is assigned for the JLTV, and a 5 for the M-ATV. My 
model calls for a mix of vehicles that yields an average grade of no lower than 7 for 
transportability, and no lower than 6 for off-road capability.  
Media reports are not consistent on the quantities of vehicles expected to be 
purchased. As budget debates persist we can expect the quantity of vehicles ordered for 
production to continue to be adjusted. For the purposes of this thesis, there is a limit the 
total number of vehicles produced at 90,000 vehicles. 
B. RESULTS 
The mathematical model developed in this thesis is implemented in Solver in 
order to obtain the optimum solution of the model using the Evolutionary solving method 
to find a good answer, and then using the Generalized Reduced Gradient (GRG) 
Nonlinear method to find the optimum solution from that point. The model and results 
are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Results of the Model. 
JLTV MATV
Objective Function
Min Cost $254,151 $8,000,000 $22,881,329,421
Contraints LHS Sign RHS
Transportability: 3 ‐2 269995 ≥ 0
Offroad Capability: 1 ‐1 89998 ≥ 0
Minimum MATV:  1 1 ≥ 1
Min JLTV 1 89999 ≥ 1






Given the assumptions and constraints, the optimum solution (Figure 1) is to 
produce 89,999 JLTVs and only 1 M-ATV. The unit cost for the JLTVs is 
$254,151 compared to $8,000,000 for 1 M-ATV, yielding a total cost of about 
$22.88 billion. 
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Despite having identical learning curves and a theoretical first unit cost 25% 
higher than that of the M-ATV, producing JLTVs exclusively is less expensive than 
producing any combination of both vehicles. This is the result of the average grade 
requirement. Producing M-ATVs exclusively would be less expensive than producing 
JLTVs, but the result would be an average grade of 5 out of 10 for both transportability 
and off-road capability. Requiring an average grade of 7 for transportability and 6 for off-
road capability necessitates producing enough JLTVs that the average grade of the fleet 
will be raised to the desired average grade. To reach the desired average grade for these 
two vehicles, a minimum of 45,000 JLTVs would need to be produced.  
Producing 45,000 M-ATVs rather than 90,000 increases the cumulative average 
cost of each M-ATV from $203,000 to $254,000. Producing 45,000 of each vehicle 
satisfies the desired mixed grades, but costs $25.7 billion. However, producing 
90,000 JLTVs and zero M-ATVs satisfies and even exceeds the desired mixed grades. 
Producing 90,000 JLTVs rather than 45,000 decreases the cumulative average cost from 
$317,000 to $254,000 and decreases the total cost to $22.9 billion. The added benefit is 
the average performance grades become 10 and 7 for transportability and off-road 
capability, respectively, which is better than the requirement for either.  
One of two things has to happen in order for the model to favor purchasing M-
ATVs over JLTVs. First, the theoretical first unit cost of the M-ATV must drop much 
lower than that of the JLTV. For example, if M-ATVs theoretical first unit cost was half 
that of JLTV, then it would be less expensive to produce the M-ATV and JLTV at 
a1:1 ratio while meeting the average performance goals. Second, if the average 
performance grades where much closer to the grades of the M-ATV than the JLTV, then 
less JLTVs would be needed to achieve the needed mix. 
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The model is sensitive to the desired average grades. Amongst the average grade 
constraints, transportability is the binding constraint. In order to identify an average 
transportability grade that would yield an optimum solution that suggests producing more 
M-ATVs than JLTVs, this thesis set the non-binding constraint, off-road capability, to a 
desired mixed grade equal to the grade of the M-ATV. This ensures off-road capability 
does not become the binding constraint while testing the sensitivity of the transportability 
constraint. For this thesis, the model is solved several times to accomplish “what if” type 
sensitivity analysis through adjusting the desired mixed grade in a bracketing fashion 
until the point at which the model begins to favor M-ATVs is identified. Figure 2 is a 
chart of the results. 
 
Figure 2.  Mixed Grade Sensitivity. 
Figure 2 shows that a desired transportability mixed grade of 5.1875 or greater 
results in an optimum ratio of 90,000 JLTVs and zero M-ATVs at a cost of $22.9 billion. 
A mixed grade of 5.125 begins to make purchasing M-ATVs optimum at a ratio of 
87,750 M-ATVs and 2,250 JLTVs, and a total cost of $19.9 billion. A mixed grade of 
5.0625 finds an optimum ratio of 88,875 M-ATVs to 1,125 JLTVs and a total cost of 
$19.3 billion. A mixed grade of 5 or less produces an optimum ratio that favors procuring 
90,000 M-ATVs at a cost $18.3 billion.  
The model is also sensitive to learning curve percentages. This thesis assumes an 
80% learning curve for both vehicles. Sensitivity analysis shows the optimum ratio of 
JLTVs and M-ATVs is consistent for learning curves of 90% or less. Learning curves of 
91% and higher find optimum ratios of nearly 1 JLTV for every 1 M-ATV. The 
conclusion here is that even when both vehicles have the same learning curve, the 
steepness of the curve affects the optimum ratio. At a 90% learning curve or steeper, 
Mixed Grade Optimal JLTVs Optimal M‐ATVs TotalCost
5.1875 90,000 0 22,873,501,753$  
5.125 2,250 87,750 19,862,425,856$  
5.0625 1,125 88,875 19,315,316,473$  
5 0 90,000 18,298,801,403$  
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procuring only JLTVs is the optimum solution. At a 91% learning curve or flatter  
(with 100% being flat) the optimum solution is to procure a mix of vehicles at nearly a 
1:1 ratio.  
What if the two vehicles do not have the same learning curve? Sensitivity analysis 
conducted near the 80% learning curve rate demonstrate that when the JLTV has an 81% 
learning curve compared to 80% for M-ATV, the optimum ratio does not change. 
However, when JLTV has an 82% learning curve compared to 80% for M-ATV, then the 
optimum ratio becomes 1 JLTV for every 1 M-ATV. The conclusion here is that 
relatively minor differences between the learning curve percentages for each vehicle can 
change the optimum ratio of vehicles to procure. Users of this decision tool should be as 
accurate as possible when selecting the learning curve for each vehicle, and should 
conduct a sensitivity analysis to determine how variations in their assumptions will affect 
the results.  
The model is sensitive to the first unit cost of each vehicle. This thesis assumes a 
first unit cost of $10 million for the JLTV and $8 million for the M-ATV. If the JLTV’s 
first unit cost was significantly higher than that of the M-ATV, then with all of the 
previous assumptions held constant, it is still possible that a mix of both vehicles 
becomes optimal compared to procuring only JLTVs. Seeking to find at which point the 
first unit cost would change the optimum solution, this thesis tested JLTV first unit costs 
compared to an $8 million first unit cost for the M-ATV. The optimum solution does not 
change until the first JLTV cost is $14 million or more. This demonstrates that at an 80% 
learning curve, the JLTV first unit cost can be significantly more than that of the M-ATV 
before the optimum ratio is changed.  
Based on the assumed desired mixed grades, learning curve percentages, and the 
theoretical first unit costs of both vehicles, this model demonstrates that it is less 
expensive to produce only the JLTV than it is to produce any combination of both 
vehicles. Altering the desired mixed grade, learning curve percentages, or the theoretical 
first unit costs may change the results, so it is necessary for the user of the model to be as 
accurate as possible when assigning these factors in the model. 
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This study proposes using a non-linear programming optimization model as a 
decision making tool to identify the optimum ratio of JLTVs and M_ATVS to be jointly 
procured by the U.S. Army and the Marine Corps.  
The U.S. Army and the Marine Corps have already procured more than  
8,000 M-ATVs and are in the process of procuring up to 90,000 thousand JLTVs by year 
2015. The two vehicles share many of the same characteristics and are designed to 
perform nearly identical missions. The redundancy between the two vehicles has drawn 
some criticism and concern over wasteful spending.  
The model developed in this thesis provides an analytical framework to view and 
analyze the decision problem faced by the Army and the Marine Corps. Specifically, the 
model built in this thesis seeks to minimize procurement costs while considering 
redundancy issues and required capabilities by the supported missions. This tool is not 
limited in its usefulness to this single decision problem. It can be applied to any number 
of other platforms or expanded to consider more than two options. For example, this 
decision making tool can be used to identify an optimum mix of manned or unmanned 
aircraft, or to find the optimum ratio of various platforms for the littoral combat ships. 
Any scenario that seeks an optimum, cost minimizing ratio of manufactured products can 
benefit from the use of this tool. 
B. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
The solution identified by the model is heavily influenced by assumptions, 
therefore the model is presented as a decision making tool and not as a call to action. As 
data becomes available, this model can be utilized over and over again to incorporate the 
updated data and to find the optimum solution.  
When solved using the assumptions described in Chapters III and IV, the model 
finds that the optimum ratio of JLTVs and M-ATVs that the Army and Marine Corps 
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should purchase is 90,000 JLTVs and zero M-ATVs at a total cost of $22.9 billion. This 
result suggests the Army and Marine Corps should not procure any more M-ATVs, rather 
the two services should purchase only JLTVs for the for their light tactical wheeled 
vehicle fleets. 
The decision model in this thesis shows that although the JLTV is initially more 
expensive to procure (~$10,000,000/unit compared to ~$8,000,000/unit), the rapid initial 
reduction in costs realized via efficiencies demonstrated in learning curve savings make 
procurement of only one or the other vehicle the only viable option. A mix of both 
vehicles only becomes cost effective in a very narrow range when both vehicles have 
nearly identical performance grades on the binding constraint (in this model the binding 
constraint is transportability). Because procuring a mix of both vehicles only becomes the 
least expensive course of action under extremely narrow conditions, the user of this 
model is unlikely to encounter a scenario where procuring both vehicles is the least 
expensive procurement method.  
C. RECOMMENDATION 
Based on the assumptions and results of the optimization model used in this 
thesis, the formulated recommendation is for the Army and Marine Corps to not procure 
any more M-ATVs and procure only JLTVs to meet the mission requirements these 
vehicles were designed to meet. In procuring only JLTVs, the services build a more 
capable fleet of vehicles than any mix of both vehicles would produce. Additionally, 
procuring only JLTVs is less expensive than procuring any mix of both vehicles.  
Procuring only M-ATVs is less expensive than procuring only JLTVs, but the 
services would lack critical capabilities in their fleet that both services require. Chief 
among these is the ability to transport the vehicle via helicopter. The M-ATV remains too 
heavy to be transported via either the Army’s CH-47 or the Marine Corps’ CH-53 
helicopters. In order to add this capability to the fleet of vehicles, at least a portion of the 
vehicles will have to be JLTVs. Once JLTVs become a requirement for at least a portion 
of the fleet, it becomes less expensive to build the entire fleet of only JLTVs.  
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D. POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Procurement costs are only a fraction of the total cost involved in a program. One 
potential area for future research is to develop a model that can incorporate life cycle cost 
estimates into a non-linear programming model. Life cycle costs could be of even greater 
value to a decision maker than procurement costs, but may contain too many variables to 
be useful in a model similar to this one. Future research in this area would be useful.  
Assigning grades to vehicle characteristics is a subjective process which opens the 
door to undue bias in the model. Development of a tool that can objectively assign 
quantifiable grades to vehicle characteristics would reduce bias and increases the 
usefulness of this model. Future research in this area would be useful.  
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